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Abstract
Emotions are a significant determinant of consumer behaviour. A
customer may get angry if he feels that he is being treated unfairly by
his supplier and that anger may make him more likely to switch to an
alternative provider. We model the strategic interaction between firms
that choose quality levels and anger-prone customers who pick their
supplier based on their expectations of suppliers’ quality. Strategic
interaction can allow for multiple equilibria including some in which
no firm invests in high quality. Allowing customers to voice their anger
on peer-review fora can eliminate low-quality equilibria, and may even
support a unique equilibrium in which all firms choose high quality.
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1 Introduction
There is much evidence that emotions – in addition to individual prefer-
ences over product attributes – are important determinants of consumer
choices. The range of negative emotions that have been linked empirically
to consumer behaviour include anger and disappointment (Smith and Bolton
(2002)), shame and envy (Richins (1997)), and embarrassment (Ruth et al.
(2002)). A range of positive emotions have also been explored – including
arousal (Steencamp et al. (1996)), joy (Nyer (1997)) and gratitude (Ruth
et al. (2002)).1 As well as allowing for improved explanation of behaviour,
attention has also been focused on how emotions can be manipulated by
marketing and advertising (Dellarocas (2003), Bagozzi et al. (1999)).
Our focus is on anger. We develop a model of consumer behaviour in
which anger emerges in response to poor service experience. We explore how
anger can drive consumers to switch providers and the extent to which such
customer attrition motivates firms to invest in quality to prevent poor service
experience. We also consider how these features may be affected if customers
share their negative experiences through online fora, in what is described as
electronic-Word-of-Mouth (e-WOM).2
Consider a setting in which customers have incomplete information about
firm characteristics, in particular firms’ investment in reducing the probabil-
ity of service failures. A customer – even a completely dispassionate one –
who experiences a service failure may revise down his assessment of his cur-
rent provider’s type and switch supplier for purely ‘rational’ reasons. This
1Laros and Steencamp (2005) present a hierarchical meta-analysis drawing a distinction
between a superordinate level of positive and negative affect – a general feeling of positivity
or negativity – and a subordinate level of specific emotions of the sort listed above. For
an excellent survey of research on the role of affect on consumer choices see the chapter
by Cohen et al. (2008) in the Handbook of Consumer Psychology.
2See Bougie et al. (2003) for an early survey of the literature. Most people can think
of instances where they or their acquaintances have switched their bank, mechanic, or
telephone company because of anger with service deemed to be unreasonably poor.
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is a cognitive process and corresponds to the notion of disconfirmation – the
extent to which perceived quality fails to match pre-purchase expectations.
Bad service may, in addition, generate an emotional response. “When
customers are dissatisfied, they also develop emotions, such as anger – the
emotion most loaded with energy” (Chebat and Ben-Amor (2005)). Anger
is a hostile emotion that is targeted at the ‘cause’ of the dissatisfaction,
with a desire to punish the wrong-doer. As Berkowitz et al. (2004) put it
in their survey, “anger is linked associatively with an urge to injure”. This
is consistent with the neurological evidence of de Quervain et al. (2004),
amongst others, that pleasure centers in the brain are activated when those
who have previously acted selfishly in an experimental economic transaction
are themselves harmed. Similarly,
“One way of thinking about this emotion in utility terms is to see
angry people as people whose utility increases when the target of
their anger is harmed.” Rotemberg (2008: 10).
“Anger in response to a service failure arises when customers appraise an
event as unfair, with high service provider control over the service failure”
(Ruth et al. (2002)). Further – and important in motivating our work – anger
is found to have a major impact on consumer switching. In their paper Angry
Customers Don’t Come Back: The Experience and Behavioral Implications
of Anger and Dissatisfaction in Services, Bougie et al. (2003) find that “...
empirically anger is a powerful predictor of customers’ behavioral responses
to failed service encounters (complaining and switching) over and above the
effect of dissatisfaction”. They use interview data to generate evidence on
consumer emotional processes: “Angry customers wanted to ‘get back at’
the organization, to hurt the business of the service provider” (Bougie et al.
(2003: 382)). These are what psychologists refer to as ‘emotivational’ goals
and are commonly associated with anger in psychological studies.
Consumers react to their own experiences, but angered customer may
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also share their negative experience by posting critical reviews on (for exam-
ple) internet review sites.3 The explosion in the use of the internet over the
last two decades has made substantial changes to how the reputation of a
firm for service quality evolves. Jim Lecinski – director of sales at Google –
coined the term “Zero Moment of Truth” (ZMOT) to describe the moment
that a consumer goes online to gather information about a good or service
they are thinking of buying, noting that 70% of US consumers say that they
look regularly at reviews posted on consumer websites to help with shopping
(Lecinski (2008)). This presents challenges for firms and has made it im-
portant to understand how online reputations are formed through electronic
word-of-mouth (e-WOM) – see, for examples, Gruen et al. (2006) and Park
and Lee (2009). Empirical evidence points to the importance of e-WOM as
a motive for brand choice and switching.4
Despite plentiful evidence of the role of anger in shaping consumer be-
haviour there have been relatively few attempts to incorporate it into formal
economic models. Notable exceptions are papers by Rotemberg (2003, 2008
and 2011).5
Our basic model is presented in Section 2. Firms can position themselves
in either a ‘basic’ segment (low price/low quality) or ‘branded’ segment (high
price/(claimed) high quality). Consumers get angry if they feel they have
been treated unfairly – if they believe their provider has charged a high price
without making a good faith effort to deliver high quality. But even a firm
3There is a growing body of empirical evidence of the role of anger in motivating hostile
internet reviews (see, for example, Hennig-Thurau et al. (2004) and Sparks and Browning
(2010)). Shen et al. (2011) provide survey-based evidence noting that “to post is a good
way to vent anger”.
4Lecinski goes on to develop the implications of e-WOM and the ZMOT for marketing
practice and how businesses should approach online reputation.
5Parts of our modeling strategy borrow from Rotemberg, but our interests are different.
Our focus is on anger in response to lapses in service quality, and how such responses might
impact the incentives for firms to invest in quality, and we analyze a competitive (rather
than single firm) setting which allows us to think about churn.
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that has invested in quality will occasionally suffer lapses in service stan-
dards, so a customer can infer dishonest behaviour only imperfectly. An
angered customer may abandon their provider in order to punish it. We
model this process of anger arousal and the subsequent switching decision
quite carefully. The analysis recognizes that the desire to switch will combine
rational elements with emotional ones, and that the degree of anger may de-
pend on the price paid. We assess the extent to which the threat of consumer
switching can generate incentives for provision of quality. We find that when
customers learn purely from their own experience, not all premium-segment
providers will invest in high quality, even when the costs of investment in
quality are relatively low.
In Section 3 we introduce ‘voice’ – the idea that angry customers may
also vent their anger to others through, say, electronic-Word-of-Mouth. The
forum for such communication may vary with setting, but we have in mind
websites such as Tripadvisor.com (travel) and TopTable.com (restaurants)
that allow users to share reviews with others. The introduction of such social
learning changes the equilibria in the model qualitatively. In particular, an
outcome in which all premium-segment firms provide high-quality service –
ruled out in Section 2 – can be sustained as an equilibrium. In Section 4 we
outline some implications of our model and consider extensions. Section 5
concludes.
2 Model
We consider a two-period model in which a population of firms compete to
offer a service to a mass of consumers. In the initial period each firm chooses
a price level (high or low) for the service. In addition, some firms may be
able to make a costly investment in the provision of quality. Consumers pick
a provider based on the price and their expectation of quality. At the start
of period 2 consumers may switch providers, and in the model that decision
4
will depend on a mixture of rational and emotional responses to their first
period experience with their provider.6
Some firms have a fixed technology that allows them to provide only
visibly low quality, q`. This segment is competitive with price p` equal to
marginal cost c of providing the service, so (p`, q`) describes the ‘basic’ (un-
branded) segment of the market.
Other firms are able to choose low or high quality provision (q` or qh).
Once chosen, quality is fixed across periods, perhaps embodied in capital, or-
ganizational structures or practices that cannot readily be adjusted. Choos-
ing high quality qh requires a one-off investment κj > 0 for firm j (this varies
across firms) but marginal cost is unchanged.7
The branded or premium segment comprises firms that charge ph > p`
and claim to provide quality qh > q`. Customers cannot observe directly
whether a particular firm has made the investment in quality, so the claim
of premium status can be made dishonestly. If so, the premium segment of
the market comprises some firms described by (ph, qh) and others described
by (ph, q`). In what follows we use λ ∈ [0, 1] to denote the fraction of the
former – good-faith suppliers of high quality – in the premium segment.
The price in the premium segment ph is formed endogenously in our
model, based on customer perceptions of average quality in this segment.
Our model examines incentives for provision of quality by characterizing
equilibrium values for λ.
6The two-period setting ensures tractability but is clearly a simplification. Later in the
paper we discuss the implications of allowing for more than two periods.
7An alternative specification could assume that quality choice affects marginal (rather
than fixed) cost, but this does not alter our results qualitatively.
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2.1 Quality and customer experience
A firm’s quality impacts its customers’ experience in a ‘noisy’ manner – high-
quality firms are more likely to deliver a good experience than low-quality
firms, but do not always do so. Realistically, high quality does not mean
perfect.
“Mistakes are an inevitable part of every service activity. Hard
as they try, even the best service companies can’t prevent the oc-
casional late flight, burned steak, or missed delivery. The fact
is that in services, no matter how rigorous the procedures and
employee training, or how advanced the technology, zero defects
is an unattainable goal.” (Hart et al. (1990: 148)).
Treating customer experience in any particular service episode as being
either good (denoted as g) or bad (b), we assume a high-quality firm delivers
a good experience with probability t < 1, while a low-quality firm delivers it
with probability s < t. These probabilities are known to be independently
and identically distributed and can be summarized as follows:
Quality choice
qh q`
Pr(good|q) t s
Pr(bad|q) 1− t 1− s
The noisy relationship between firms’ quality choices and customers’ ex-
perience implies that customers face a signal extraction problem. A customer
who experiences a bad service episode in the premium segment may have
picked a low-quality firm or may just have had an unlucky encounter with
a high-quality firm. Given prior beliefs that a randomly-picked provider is
high quality with probability λ, the Bayesian posterior conditional on a bad
experience is
Pr(qh|b) = λ(1− t)
λ(1− t) + (1− λ)(1− s) ≡ ρb. (1)
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Clearly ρb < λ for any 0 < λ < 1: a bad experience lowers confidence in the
provider’s quality. The gap between t and s determines the precision of the
signal: with a larger gap a customer’s experience is a tighter signal of the
firm’s quality choice.
2.2 Consumer utility
A consumer gets more utility from a good service episode than a bad one,
so that ug > ub. To save notation we define uˆ = ug − ub. Given the relative
likelihood of good and bad experiences, a consumer is willing to pay as much
as sug + (1− s)ub for service provided by a low-quality firm. We assume that
customers employ at least the basic version of the service in each period.8
With competitive prices p` = c in the basic segment, we only require
Assumption 1 (Customers always purchase) sug + (1− s)ub > c.
In contrast, the expected utility of service from a reliably high-quality
provider is tug + (1 − t)ub. Consumers who pick a provider randomly from
the premium segment, where fraction λ of providers are expected to be high
quality, are willing to pay a premium
p(λ) = λ(t− s)uˆ. (2)
over what they pay for the service in the basic segment.
Other things equal, a consumer’s choice of segment would be based on
a comparison of the quality premium p(λ) with the actual price differential
ph − p` across the segments. If ph − p` < p(λ) the gain in expected utility
more than compensates for the higher price ph in the premium segment. If
ph − p` > p(λ) customers would be better-off picking a provider in the basic
segment. In the absence of other considerations, both segments will co-exist
8This allows us to focus on customer churn – their movement between providers –
though it could be relaxed without disturbing our results.
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if and only if ph−p` = p(λ). With the basic segment serving as a competitive
fringe, with p` = c, price ph in the premium segment is an increasing function
of λ
Of course, in two-period settings such as ours, consumers’ choice in the ini-
tial period may be more complicated than a simple trade-off between current
utility and price. To the extent they anticipate the possibility of switching
providers in the future, they must consider their optimal sequence of choices.
For instance, a forward-looking customer – especially one with low switching
costs – might be tempted to ‘take a chance’ on the premium segment, know-
ing that in the event of a bad experience he could easily switch to the basic
segment. The introduction of emotivational factors may complicate this fur-
ther: consumers who know themselves particularly prone to anger might shy
away from the premium segment to forestall the possibility of future anger
(‘anger aversion’). If so, the price differential across the segments in the
initial period may depend on consumers’ switching costs and on the psychic
costs and benefits of their choices. While the actual price differential in the
initial period ph− p` may be higher or lower than p(λ), it would nevertheless
be an increasing function of λ.
The trade-off between utility and price allows us to pin down, more pre-
cisely, the price that can be sustained in the premium segment in the second
period. We next focus on how that price affects customer churn within the
branded segment.
2.3 Switching when consumers get angered by ripoffs
How does a customer who has paid the higher price ph to obtain the premium
service respond to an episode of bad service? As a Bayesian updater, he
revises downwards his assessment that his service provider is high-quality
(recall equation (1)). This generates incentives to switch providers, and we
differentiate between rational incentives and emotional ones.
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Rational gain from switching: Following a bad service episode, the con-
sumer’s posterior assessment that his provider is high-quality is ρb while the
probability that a randomly-picked alternative provider is high-quality re-
mains λ > ρb. So what we will call the ‘rational gain from switching’ is
(λ− ρb)(t− s)uˆ. (3)
Anger and the emotivational gain from switching: Poor service may also
arouse anger and emotionally-driven behaviour. Customers who feel ‘ripped
off’ may become angry and want to get back at the firm that they believe has
treated them badly. They may do this by switching – taking their custom
elsewhere and so depriving the supplier of future business. A rip-off in the
current setting involves a firm that charges a premium price ph > p` despite
being low-quality.9 In our setting customers never know for sure that they
have been ripped off, but those who have suffered a bad experience have a
probabilistic assessment, (1 − ρb). In diverting their custom away they can
impose a penalty on the rip-off supplier by depriving it of future profit. For
a premium-segment firm profit per customer depends on the price differen-
tial that can be sustained without losing customers to the basic segment.
Assuming, for simplicity, that some consumers can switch costlessly to the
basic segment, profit per customer in the second period is (at least) p(λ). So
(1− ρb)p(λ) captures the expected penalty that can be imposed upon rip-off
merchants – something from which anger-prone customers derive utility or
emotivational benefits (recall the earlier quotations from Rotemberg (2008)
and de Quervain et al. (2004)).
9If anger is triggered by a sense of being treated unfairly, we require agents to have
a reference point as to what constitutes fair treatment (this is an application of Kahne-
man, Knetsch and Thaler’s (1986) theory that consumers feel entitled to their “reference
transaction”). Firms selecting (ph, qh) or (p`, q`) are not only being honest but also deliver
positive expected utility to the consumer. In contrast, a firm choosing (ph, q`) is dishonest
and might deliver negative utility. A customer learning ex post that their supposedly
premium supplier chose low quality would feel ‘ripped off’ – in effect duped into making
a choice by an unscrupulous firm in pursuit of excess profit.
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It is realistic to suppose that customers vary according to their anger
‘type’ – the strength of the emotivational benefits they derive from this sort
of retribution. For the i-th customer that weight is labeled by γi ≥ 0, with
distribution G(γ) in the population. Those very prone to anger have a high
value of γ, whilst a ‘conventional’ economic agent has γ = 0. The emotiva-
tional gain from switching after a bad service experience is
γi (1− ρb)p(λ), (4)
or, after substituting for p(λ) from (2),
γi (1− ρb)λ(t− s)uˆ. (5)
A decision to switch draws on both rational and emotional elements.10
A customer will switch in the second period if and only if the rational and
emotivational returns exceed the costs of switching.
We allow heterogeneity in switching costs, so that the cost of switching
from one premium segment firm to another is ωi for the i -th customer.
11 The
i-th consumer will switch following a bad experience if the sum of (3) and
(5) exceeds ωi: that is, if and only if
[(λ− ρb) + γi(1− ρb)λ)] (t− s)uˆ ≥ ωi. (6)
10Before we proceed it is worth noting an alternative interpretation of expression (4)
– namely that the extent of a customer’s anger depends upon the size of the rip-off. If
a customer comes to believe that his supplier has misrepresented a low-quality offering
as being high quality then the intensity of his anger might reasonably be increasing in
the size of the premium. While our argument for the inclusion of p(λ) in (4) was as a
measure of amount of retribution (consistent with the desire for revenge motive highlighted
in the seminal analysis of Rotemberg and others) it equally allows for this alternative
interpretation. Indeed, we could model emotivational benefit as any arbitrary, increasing
function of p(λ), (1− ρb) and γi. Our results are robust to such alternative formulations.
11That switching costs vary across individuals is realistic, but is not strictly necessary
for the analysis in this section. The assumed heterogeneity is analytically useful in later
sections of this paper, where it ensures switching behaviour is always continuous in λ.
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Using equation (1), this is equivalent to
m(λ) [(t− s) + γi(1− s)](t− s)uˆ ≥ ωi, (7)
where for ease of notation we define
m(λ) ≡
[
λ(1− λ)
λ(1− t) + (1− λ)(1− s)
]
.
The term m(λ) captures how the incentives to switch depend on λ as it
varies in the unit interval. Notably, m(λ) is non-monotonic in λ, with its
value approaching zero as λ tends to 0 or to 1, but is positive in the interior
of the unit interval. The result below follows.
Result 1 Other things being equal, the gains from switching are lower when
average quality in the premium segment is either very low or very high.
The gains from switching are lowest at the two extremes, though for quite
different reasons. When λ is close to zero, most firms are low quality so the
expected gain from switching to a rival provider is small. On the emotiva-
tional front, while the gap 1− ρb generates anger, the anger is tempered by
the feature that the low average quality supports only a small price premium
p(λ). The emotivational gain from switching is small too.
On the other hand, when λ is close to 1 almost all firms are of high
quality and the consumer’s loss of confidence in his supplier in the wake of a
bad service episode is less pronounced (this is a familiar feature of Bayesian
updating). In other words, with a high prior a customer is more likely to
interpret a bad experience as an unlucky episode with a high-quality firm,
rather than indicative of low quality.
Overall, the incentive to switch varies with the anger propensity param-
eter γi and the switching cost parameter ωi. In particular, more anger-prone
customers (with high γi) or those with lower switching costs (low ωi) are
more likely to switch. The distribution of parameters, G(γ) for γi and Ω(ω)
for ωi, are assumed to be common knowledge, continuous, and mutually in-
dependent.
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2.4 Customer attrition and aggregate churn
In the initial period, consumers choose between the basic and premium seg-
ments of the market. Those who buy from the basic segment have no incen-
tive to switch suppliers in our simple setting, so a firm that locates itself in
this segment never loses customers.
Consumers who buy initially from the premium segment cannot distin-
guish between high and low quality providers. For simplicity we assume that
all firms in this segment are similar in size so that we can normalize their ini-
tial customer base at one unit (this is relaxed in Section 4). In this premium
segment the behaviour of consumers who have a good initial experience is
trivial to analyze. For them positive experience reinforces confidence in the
quality of their current provider so they have no rational or emotional gains
from switching – they stick with their current supplier.
Among consumers who suffer a poor initial experience, some, based on
rational and emotivational considerations, may choose to switch away from
their current provider. For any premium-segment firm we define the cus-
tomer attrition rate σ(λ) as the fraction of customers who abandon that
firm following a bad experience in the initial period – in other words, this
is the fraction of customers for whom condition (7) holds.12 Continuity of
the underlying parameter distributions ensures that σ is a smooth function
of λ.13
To understand how σ(λ) varies with λ, consider (7). Since the gain from
switching is non-monotonic (Result 1), so too is the attrition rate σ(λ). In-
deed, given m(λ) it is easy to check that there is no attrition at all when
λ = 0 or λ = 1, and there exists a λˆ in the unit interval such that the
gain from switching is increasing in the interval (0, λˆ) and decreasing in the
12For given λ and γi the fraction of customers who switch is z(λ, γi) = Ω(m(λ)[(t− s) +
γi(1− s)](t− s)uˆ). The attrition rate is then given by σ(λ) =
∫
z(λ, γi)dG(γi).
13To avoid trivialities associated with prohibitive switching costs, we assume σ(λ) > 0
for at least some values of λ.
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interval (λˆ, 1).14 We summarize this as follows.
Result 2 If a fraction λ of the providers in the premium segment are high
quality, the attrition rate for consumers who suffer a bad experience is σ(λ)
where
1. σ(0) = 0 and σ(1) = 0;
2. σ(λ) is increasing in λ for λ ∈ (0, λˆ) and decreasing in λ ∈ (λˆ, 1).
It is straightforward to see that a more anger-prone population (in the
sense of stochastic dominance of G(γ), the distribution of the anger param-
eter), will display higher customer attrition rates for any λ.
The movement of consumers among premium-segment firms comes exclu-
sively from those who have a bad service experience. Among the fraction λ
of firms that are high-quality, a proportion (1 − t) of customers have a bad
experience in period 1; among the fraction (1−λ) of premium segment firms
that are low-quality, a fraction (1 − s) do. Adding the two, and recalling
that a fraction σ(λ) of customers with bad experiences switch, the aggregate
churn at the end of the initial period is
Ψ(λ) = [(1− s)− λ(t− s)]σ(λ). (8)
While higher average quality reduces the incidence of bad experiences (that
is, the first term is decreasing in λ), the conditional attrition rate σ(λ) is non-
monotonic in λ. The aggregate churn Ψ(λ) inherits this non-monotonicity.
Further, aggregate churn is zero at the extremes, λ = 0 and λ = 1.
14It is straightforward to verify that λˆ =
(1−s)−
√
(1−s)(t−s)
t−s . There are two solutions
to the quadratic equation that leads to this, but the other solution lies outside the unit
interval so is not relevant.
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2.5 Quality choice by firms
For firms that present themselves in the premium segment, quality choice
involves a trade-off: high quality requires upfront investment κj but enhances
customer retention. To the extent that retained customers are profitable this
provides an incentive to invest in quality. Recall that given λ, profit per
customer in the second period equals ph − c = λ(t− s)uˆ.
More generally, investment in quality can improve a firm’s profitability
both through better retention of its existing customer base and through im-
proved acquisition of new customers. Analysis in this section is simplified,
however, by the feature that customers learn only from their own experiences
and – garnering no information on rival providers – switching customers can
do no better than selecting a new provider at random. This means a firm’s
choice of quality does not affect the rate at which it picks-up new disaffected
customers at the start of period 2. We relax this assumption in Section 3.
We consider how a premium-segment firm’s choice affects its two-period
profits, ignoring discounting. A firm that chooses qh expects to lose a fraction
(1 − t)σ(λ) of its initial customers in period 2, while a firm that chooses q`
while pretending to be high quality expects to lose a fraction (1 − s)σ(λ).
Thus, investing in high quality reduces customer attrition by (t − s)σ(λ),
thereby improving future profits by amount λσ(λ)(t − s)2uˆ. At the same
time choosing high quality entails higher cost κj so that the net incremental
gain from choosing high quality is
∆(λ, κj) = λσ(λ)(t− s)2uˆ− κj. (9)
Crucially, a firm’s incremental profit depends on λ (as the aggregate propor-
tion of high-quality providers affects its customer retention) and on κj (its
direct cost of investing in high quality).
A firm will prefer to choose high quality, then, if and only if ∆(λ, κj) ≥ 0.
For any λ, this condition is more likely to be met for firms whose cost of
investing in quality is relatively low, that is, those with κj small enough. Let
14
the distribution of κj be given by a continuous distribution function K(κ).
Then, for any λ, the fraction of firms for whom investment in high quality is
profitable is given by F (λ) = K(λσ(λ)(t− s)2uˆ).
Note that firms’ incentives to choose high quality depend on expected
attrition, but customers’ attrition rates vary themselves with average quality
λ in the premium segment (recall Result 2). Given this strategic interaction,
we focus on Nash equilibria in which (a) each firm’s choice of quality is
optimal given the choices of other firms and behaviour of customers and, (b)
customers switch optimally given their beliefs about firms’ quality. If F (λ)
captures the mass of firms that find if profitable to choose high quality when
aggregate proportion of high quality firms is believed to be λ, equilibrium
configurations require that F (λ∗) = λ∗.
Our setting allows for multiple equilibria. We begin with one which is
degenerate in the provision of quality. Consider a configuration in which no
firm chooses high quality, that is, consider λ = 0. From Result 2, there is no
customer attrition at all and if investment in quality is costly, it follows from
equation (9) that it will not be profitable for any firm to invest in quality.
We have an equilibrium with F (0) = 0.
If the fixed costs of investing in quality is relatively high for all firms, the
above outcome will be the unique equilibrium: if F (λ) < λ for all λ > 0,
attrition rates are too low to justify any investment in high quality to be
sustained in equilibrium. To explore outcomes other than this trivial one, we
consider the case where costs of investment in quality are low enough and
anger-fueled churn sufficiently strong, so that F (λ) > λ for at least some λ.
Formally, we have
Assumption 2 There exists some λ ∈ (0, 1) such that F (λ) > λ.
This assumption allows for the existence of multiple equilibria.
Proposition 1 In a setting where angry customers may switch to a randomly-
picked rival provider, strategic interaction between customers and firms gen-
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erates multiple equilibria. The equilibria differ in the quality choice of firms
in the premium segment and associated customers’ attrition rates.
• There exists an equilibrium in which all firms choose low quality (λ = 0)
and the attrition rate for disgruntled customers is zero (σ(0) = 0).
• Under Assumption 2 there also exist equilibria in which some fraction
λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) of firms choose high quality and disgruntled customers’ be-
haviour is described by σ(λ∗) > 0.
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Figure 1: Fraction of firms choosing high quality
A formal proof is in the Appendix. But to understand the qualitative
properties of these equilibria consider Figure 1, which plots F (λ), the fraction
of firms that find it profitable to invest in quality, as a function of λ. Given
the pattern of customer attrition described in Result 2, F (λ) is zero at λ = 0
(and, indeed, with strictly positive κj, for all λ sufficiently close to zero) and
also at λ = 1. For some intervening range in the unit interval, investment
in quality is profitable for low-cost firms, so that F (λ) is strictly positive.
Assumption 2 places the stronger requirement that F (λ) > λ for some λ: if
so, the graph of F (λ) must intersect the 45-degree line.
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Equilibria are characterized by λ∗ such that F (λ∗) = λ∗. At the first
equilibrium – labeled e0 in the figure – all firms choose low quality (λ
∗
0 = 0).
If so, customers do not gain from switching (both the rational and emotiva-
tional gain from switching are zero). Without customer attrition, there is no
incentive for any firm to invest in quality, so that F (λ∗0) = 0. This equilib-
rium is degenerate from the viewpoint of quality provision and characterized
by no-quality-and-no-churn. Effectively, in this case the premium and basic
segments of the market coincide.
When Assumption 2 holds, the interaction between firms and angry cus-
tomers supports other (possibly multiple) equilibria, here labeled e1 and e2.
At these equilibria customer attrition is such that a fraction F (λ∗) = λ∗ of
firms – those whose fixed costs of investment in quality are low enough – find
it profitable to invest in high quality. As shown here, this equality obtains
at two distinct values of λ, with λ∗2 > λ
∗
1 > 0. However, the equilibrium
associated with the lower of these values is unstable, leaving e2 as the locally
stable equilibrium. Importantly, this equilibrium is characterized by positive
churn and positive investment in quality.
The role of customer anger in this setting merits clarification. A more
anger-prone population of customers – in the sense of stochastic dominance
of G(γ) – will lead to higher conditional attrition rates σ(λ) and thereby
increase the number of firms that find it profitable to invest in high quality for
any λ: in terms of the equilibria described above, F (λ) is weakly increasing
in anger. If so, an angrier population is associated with higher equilibrium
value λ∗2. Put simply, greater customer anger sustains greater provision of
quality.
Besides, anger may have a discrete effect on the equilibrium outcomes
if it implies a greater likelihood that Assumption 2 holds: in other words,
there may be parameter configurations where attrition rates for dispassionate
customers are too weak to support any investment in quality (that is, e0
is the unique equilibrium) while angry customers might well induce some
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investment in quality (support e2 as an equilibrium).
However, remarkably, anger cannot support comprehensive investment in
quality, even when the population is extremely prone to anger and the cost
of investment in quality is relatively small. Formally,
Result 3 An outcome in which all firms in the premium segment choose
high quality is never an equilibrium.
To see why, note that if all firms choose high quality, there is little incen-
tive for customers to switch providers. But if the attrition rate is zero, firms’
incentive to invest in high quality disappears. Thus all premium-segment
firms choosing high quality cannot be an equilibrium outcome in this set-
ting.
3 Revenge of keyboard warriors
Our analysis in the previous section shows that when anger manifests itself
in the form of ‘exit’ alone, it provides only limited incentives to invest in
quality. Equilibrium outcomes may involve no investment in quality or, at
best, even when the cost of investing in quality is relatively low, less than
complete investment in quality.
In many settings disgruntled customers react to poor service not just by
switching their own custom, but also by sharing their negative experiences
with others. Historically this may have been through negative word-of-mouth
within a limited community, but the internet has allowed for much wider
dissemination. Online sharing of bad experiences has become quite com-
mon. Some of the most popular websites are essentially fora for customers to
share experiences with strangers (for example, tripadvisor.com), but social
networking tools are often used to share information about errant service
providers. As the BBC’s Business Editor put it:
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“Once upon a time companies could afford to be rude. Angry
customers would grumble to a few friends, withdraw their custom,
but there was little else they could do. Today, they still tell their
friends, but they do it online, using media websites like YouTube,
Facebook and Twitter”
BBC Business News website, 3 October 2010.
Here we extend our model to allow for public sharing of negative ex-
periences.15 Significantly, we find that it impacts not only the intensity of
customer attrition, but also the qualitative characteristics of the equilibria.
The outcome depends upon the nature and extent of learning in ways that
we will describe.
In terms of our model, incorporating an assumption that some (or all)
angry customers disseminate negative reviews has two effects: (a) It allows
customers to learn more about the quality-type of their own provider. Rather
than relying just on their own experience, customers can learn from the neg-
ative reports of others. Was my negative experience at hotel X an isolated
instance, or did other guests also have bad experiences? Second, (b), it also
allows customers to learn more about the quality-type of other providers.
This means that switchers, rather than going to a randomly-chosen alterna-
tive, can make a more informed choice of new supplier. In particular they
can identify firms that are more likely to be high quality. So switchers are
disproportionately ‘channeled’ to high-quality firms. From a firm’s perspec-
tive, investment in quality boosts profits both through better retention of
current customers and better acquisition of new ones.
To assess the impact of these information channels, we develop two cases.
We begin, most starkly, with the case of complete information in period 2,
before considering a more general case.
15We ignore dishonest reviews. Firms may be tempted to use dishonest reviews to boost
their own standing, or to sabotage the standing of competitors (Dellarocas (2006)).
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3.1 Complete information
Assume that all consumers who have a bad service experience in the initial
period post a negative review on a public forum. With a sufficiently large
number of customers, such reviews would be completely revealing. Suppose
at the end of the initial period every consumer knows the quality type of
every firm, including their own, with certainty. This is a stark and unrealistic
assumption, but it will provide a benchmark.
What does switching behaviour look like in this case? At the end of
the first period, customers who find themselves with low-quality providers
have the usual rational and emotivational incentives to switch. The rational
gain from switching is now (t− s)uˆ (because a switcher is able to identify a
new provider who is high-quality with probability one). The emotivational
benefits are now γi(t− s)uˆ. The switching condition, then, is
(1 + γi)(t− s)uˆ ≥ ωi. (10)
Comparing (10) with (6), it is easy to see that the customers are more likely
to switch in this case. The associated attrition rate, which we denote as σ,
is higher than the previously-derived σ(λ) for all λ.
In this setting investment in quality is attractive to a forward-looking firm
both because it reduces customer attrition and also enhances acquisition of
new customers who have deserted other providers. With complete informa-
tion a low-quality firm expects to lose a fraction σ of its customer while a
high quality firm loses none. The advantage of higher quality in terms of
customer retention is precisely σ.
The gain from acquiring new customers depends on the aggregate churn.
Given attrition rate σ for low-quality firms and zero for high quality ones,
aggregate churn in a population where a fraction λ is high quality equals
Ψ(λ) = (1− λ)σ. (11)
We assume that switchers are allocated equally among firms that are revealed
to be of high quality. Combining the gains from better (in fact, complete)
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customer retention and better customer acquisition, high quality improves
period-2 customer base by
σ +
Ψ(λ)
λ
=
σ
λ
. (12)
Given that firms’ quality levels are known in period 2, high-quality firms
sell at a premium p(1) = (t− s)uˆ, with implied profit (t− s)uˆ per customer.
The incremental net benefit from investing in high quality equals
∆(λ, κj) =
σ
λ
(t− s)uˆ− κj. (13)
Comparing (9) and (13) it is easy to see that ∆(λ, κj) > ∆(λ, κj): com-
plete information boosts both customer retention and acquisition, generating
stronger incentives for firms to invest in high quality. Since the attrition rate
σ is positive, limλ→0 ∆(λ, κj) is positive for any (finite) κj.
As before, given the distribution of fixed costs κj, we can compute the
fraction of firms that will find it profitable to invest in high quality. We define
this as F (λ) = K(σ
λ
(t− s)uˆ). Observe – in contrast to the case in Section 2
– that F (λ) is weakly decreasing in λ, with limλ→0 F (λ) strictly positive. We
assume κj are bounded above so, in fact, limλ→0 F (λ) = 1.
We can note immediately – and in contrast to Proposition 1 – that the
outcome in which no firm invests in quality is not an equilibrium. Intuitively,
if no other firm invests in high quality, it is extremely profitable for any
particular firm to do so – with full information it would expect to attract all
switching customers. In this case the equilibrium is necessarily unique.
Proposition 2 With complete information, the strategic interaction between
customers and firms generates a unique equilibrium: it involves greater cus-
tomer churn and a higher fraction of firms choosing high quality than the
case without complete information.
Once again, a formal proof is in the Appendix. Importantly, here the
firms’ choice of quality is constrained only by the cost κj. We cannot rule
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out the possibility that if this fixed cost is low enough for all firms, they
would all find it profitable to invest in quality. In that case, equilibrium is
given by F (1) = 1.
3.2 Incomplete information: a general case
The outcome of social learning in Section 3.1 is stark – at the end of pe-
riod 1 all consumers have full information. In realistic settings the extent of
learning from the experiences of others is less comprehensive, and we model
this here in a very general extension. We consider a setting in which each
customer learns about his provider’s quality both from his own private ex-
perience and through other channels of public information, such as online
reviews. The precise informational content of these public channels may
vary, and different individuals may see, assimilate and combine information
from different sources to varying extents. We develop an argument directly
in terms of attrition rates, so that the details of the learning mechanism are
‘black-boxed’.
Assume that customers assess their current provider’s quality both di-
rectly (through their own experience) and through social learning (that col-
lates others’ experiences). For a firm that choose quality q ∈ {q`, qh} we
define σq(λ) to be the average attrition rate for customers whose own direct
experience is  ∈ {b, g}. Specifically, for a low-quality firm, the attrition rate
is σ`b(λ) for customers who have a bad experience, and σ`g(λ) for those who
had a good experience. Similarly, for a firm that chooses high quality, we can
define σhb(λ) and σhg(λ) as the attrition rates contingent on bad and good
experiences. As before these attrition rates will vary with λ.
We can compare these attrition rates quite generally. With the possibility
of learning from others, even customers with a positive personal experience
with their provider may sometimes be tempted to switch to other providers
who have garnered even more favorable reviews: in other words, σqg(λ) could
well be positive in this setting. But other things equal, a firm faces higher
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attrition from customers who have a bad experience rather than a good one,
as the former are likely be more pessimistic and angrier: we have σ`b(λ) ≥
σ`g(λ) and σhb(λ) ≥ σhg(λ).
To the extent customers also learn from others’ experiences, they are
more likely to be pessimistic about – and hence more likely to abandon
– firms whose low quality is revealed through others’ reviews. We expect
σ`b(λ) ≥ σhb(λ) and σ`g(λ) ≥ σhg(λ). In words, for any category of direct
experience, the availability of public information is likely to reinforce attrition
from low-quality relative to high-quality providers.16
Given the differential attrition rates we can evaluate aggregate churn
based on the proportion of firms that choose high or low quality and the
customers’ experiences contingent on those quality choices. We expect
Ψ(λ) = λ[tσhg + (1− t)σhb] + (1− λ)[sσ`g + (1− s)σ`b], (14)
where the conditional attrition rates σq themselves vary with λ.
As before, a firm’s quality choice affects its future customer base through
its impact on retention and on acquisition. We consider these in turn. Choos-
ing high quality rather than low improves customer retention by
[sσ`g + (1− s)σ`b]− [tσhg + (1− t)σhb]. (15)
The acquisition rate for new customers varies with the availability of
public information. In the absence of any public information about firms’
quality, as in Section 2, there was no differential in the acquisition rate for
a high quality firm relative to a low quality firm. When public information
was completely revealing, as in Section 3.1, all switching customers were
16The scenarios analyzed earlier in the paper are nested as special cases. In particular
when private experience is the only channel for learning (Section 2) we have σ`b = σhb = σb
and σ`g = σhg = σg; indeed, there σb = σ and σg = 0. With complete information,
individual experiences do not matter, so that σ`b = σ`g = σ` and σhb = σhg = σh. In the
complete information version in Section 3.1, the setting was even sharper, with σ` = σ
and σh = 0.
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able to choose a high quality firm with probability 1. We generalize these
environments by supposing that, in a population where a fraction λ of firms
is high quality, a switching customer can identify a high-quality firm with
probability λα, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is a measure of noise. When α = 0, the
customer is able to pick a high-quality firm with probability 1; when α = 1,
a customer can pick a high-quality firm with probability λ (that is, no better
than a random pick). Importantly, the attrition rates σq defined above will
themselves depend on α.
So, in general, a fraction λα of the churn Ψ(λ) is directed to high-quality
firms, while the residual fraction (1 − λα) ends up with low-quality firms.
Given the proportions of firms in each group, the differential advantage, in
terms of customer acquisition, for a high quality firm is17(
λα
λ
− 1− λ
α
1− λ
)
Ψ(λ) =
(
λα−1 − 1
1− λ
)
Ψ(λ). (16)
Combining the gain from better customer retention (15) with that from
better acquisition (16), the choice of high relative to low quality improves a
firm’s second-period customer base by
β(λ) ≡ λα−1[sσ`g + (1− s)σ`b] +
(
λα − 1
1− λ
)
[tσhg + (1− t)σhb]. (17)
Note that β(λ), which summarizes the impact of customer churn on a firm’s
future customer base in any particular information setting, is sensitive to
customers’ propensity to anger, especially when anger has a marked effect on
attrition rates σhb and σ`b in the event of unhappy experiences for customers.
The final step is to assess the impact of the customer base on profits.
If switching customers end up with high-quality firms with probability λα,
the mark-up of premium-segment over basic-segment price that the market
17To see this, note that the churn λαΨ(λ) is shared across the fraction λ of firms that is
high quality, while the residual (1− λα)Ψ(λ) is shared among the 1− λ low quality firms.
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will sustain in the second period is λα(t− s)uˆ.18 For firm j, the incremental
benefit from investing in high quality is
∆α(λ, κj) = β(λ)λ
α(t− s)uˆ− κj, (18)
so that the fraction of firms who invest in high quality equals
Fα(λ) = K(β(λ)λ
α(t− s)uˆ). (19)
Proposition 3 With partial public information, strategic interaction between
firms’ quality choices and customer attrition allows multiple equilibria.
• If Fα(0) = 0, then there exists an equilibrium in which no firm invests
in high quality and there is no attrition.
• If Fα(λ∗) = λ∗ for some λ∗ ∈ (0, 1], there exist equilibria in which a
fraction λ∗ of firms choose high quality and attrition rates are positive.
This is a general result and follows directly from the previous arguments.
It subsumes the previous cases but also covers a much wider set of environ-
ments.
For instance, suppose that publicly-available information from customer
review sites is such that customers learn nothing beyond their personal ex-
periences about their own providers, but if they choose to abandon their
current provider the available information can guide them reliably to high-
quality alternatives. Formally, we have α = 0. Choice of high quality then
enhances the future customer base by
β(λ) =
1
λ
[sσ`g + (1− s)σ`b], (20)
18Again the earlier versions are nested as special cases. In particular, if α = 1 switching
customers pick another firm randomly, so will pay a premium of no more than λ(t − s)uˆ
(the personal experience model in Section 2). If α = 0, they pick an unambiguously better
firm and will pay a premium of up to (t− s)uˆ (the full-information version in Section 3.1).
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with incremental profit
∆0(λ, κj) =
1
λ
[sσ`g + (1− s)σ`b](t− s)uˆ− κj. (21)
With public information, attrition rates are necessarily positive even for small
λ, so at least some firms have incentive to invest in high quality. If so
limλ→0 F0(λ) > 0 then λ = 0 cannot be an equilibrium outcome here. At the
other extreme, for λ close to 1, customers’ gain from switching are limited,
and with low attrition rates the incentive to invest in quality is less than
complete: we have F0(1) < 1. If so, λ = 1 cannot be an equilibrium either. In
this case, equilibrium outcome(s) necessarily involve only some firms choosing
high quality.
The second part of Proposition 3 highlights the finding that in circum-
stances where public information, say that triggered by anger, guides cus-
tomer churn, the provision of high quality by all firms may be sustained as
a possible equilibrium. Indeed, the possibility exists even when information
revelation is not complete, and is in stark contrast to the result in Proposition
1 – developed in the absence of sharing of information amongst consumers –
where this could never be the case.
4 Extensions
Our model is stylized. In this section we explore the implications of relaxing
its assumptions for a broader assessment of the relationship between customer
anger, switching behaviour, and quality choice.
4.1 Repetition
The two-period structure of our model ensures tractability but is limited in
scope. Without providing a full-fledged multi-period model we conjecture
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that extending the number of periods would complicate the analysis in a
number of ways.
With multiple periods we expect consumers’ learning and their responses
to be more complex. The subjective assessment of a firm’s quality would be
based not on a single experience with its service but on the entire history of
experiences. Consumer responses would incorporate the possibility of ongo-
ing learning. Following an initial bad experience, a customer may choose to
give his provider the ‘benefit of the doubt’. Repeated bad experience may
trigger anger and the search for a better provider.
Similarly the punishment options available to angered customers would be
richer, as in other repeated games involving punishment. Anger might result
in temporary defection (‘will not patronize your restaurant for n periods’)
or permanent defection. We would also have to incorporate the possibility
that customers’ anger gradually dissipates as the emotional trigger becomes
more distant in time, but equally ‘forgiveness’ may be an aspect of ‘rational
play’ in the strategic interaction. If firms can adjust their quality over time,
we might expect a multitude of equilibria, supported by the standard folk-
theorem arguments. If, on the other hand, quality is fixed across periods,
low-quality providers might be driven out progressively through time.
We could also consider the possible entry of new providers: this would
throw up questions about how a new entrant wins custom and builds a rep-
utation against incumbent providers.
Multiple periods also raise the possibility of a sequence of short-lived gen-
erations of customers interacting with long-lived firms. If the transmission of
firms’ reputations across generations is less than complete, periodic replen-
ishment of the customer pool with arrival of ‘new blood’ may help preserve
the customer base of low-quality firms. This would dilute incentives to in-
vest in quality, in a variant on the ‘tourists and natives’ model of Salop and
Stiglitz (1977). However, if the inter-generational sharing of experience is
high, it would reinforce incentives to invest in quality.
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Multi-period versions of our extended model – that with social learning –
might generate some interesting additional dynamics. Our working assump-
tion was that angry customers provide reviews based on their own experience
alone. Evidence on review behaviour is more subtle. Dellarocas and Narayan
(2010), for example, study some dynamic aspects of internet postings in the
context of movie reviews and find that, other things equal, the propensity to
make a negative post is increasing in the number of existing negative posts,
suggesting the possibility of path dependence in social learning.
4.2 Other instruments to manage reputation
In our model firms choose price and quality but are otherwise passive in the
face of customer anger. In real-world setting firms might be expected to
manage their reputations by responding to complaints in other ways. Most
consumer-facing firms have specialist departments that respond to individual
instances of poor customer experience.
A variety of instruments may be used to manage angry customers – for
instance, simple apologies, money-back guarantees, or discounts on future
purchases. The efficacy of some of these strategies have been studied before
in managerial settings.19 Traditionally the focus of management practice in
this area has been retention of the angry customer himself but preventing
hostile internet postings could be a more important consideration.
One strategy to assuage anger is to offer a ‘money-back guarantee’ that
offers a rebate m as compensation to any customer who has suffered a ver-
ifiably bad experience. If such a guarantee can prevent customer attrition
altogether, firms face a simple one-period pricing problem, but one where
the price is contingent on consumer experience. The expected cost of such
19See, for examples, Smith and Bolton (2002) and Menon and Dube (2004). Kubo
et al. (2012), for example, present experimental evidence on how a simple apology for
a bad episode reduces the physiological manifestations of anger (skin temperature, skin
conductance response, etc.).
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guarantees is lower for high-quality firms, so we can construct equilibrium
outcomes in which only firms that can invest in quality at relatively low fixed
costs κj do so.
Consider a setting in which firms that choose high quality charge a price
phg to the fraction t of its customers who have a good experience, while
charging a lower effective price phb = phg − m to those who have a bad
experience. Firms that choose low quality charge a fixed price p`, which in
a competitive environment will be driven down to marginal cost c. Here the
contingent price-schedule (phg, phb) should be such that customers are willing
to buy from high-quality firms, and at the same time firms that do not invest
in quality do not find it profitable to mimic the price schedule of high-quality
firms. It is easy to show that phg = c+ (1− s)uˆ and phb = c− suˆ can support
such an equilibrium. Note that such equilibria require a bad experience to be
verifiable, otherwise all customers would gain from claiming a bad experience.
Where money-back guarantees can support such equilibria, the provision of
quality does not rely on the mechanisms described in this paper.
An alternative strategy, closer in spirit to our model of customer attrition,
might involve giving disgruntled customers a discount voucher worth  against
their future purchase. The award of such vouchers as compensation for poor
customer experience is commonplace in many markets, such as air travel.
A voucher is of value only to customers who stay with the firm, so it is
natural to analyze in our two-period set-up. Higher-valued vouchers can
better placate angry customers so the attrition rate is a decreasing function
of : we write σ() with σ′ < 0. Also, the prospect of future discounts 
in the event of unsatisfactory experiences would allow firms that offer such
discounts to charge a higher price ex-ante, so that we have an increasing price
function ph().
Our focus here is not on the optimal choice of , but on the implications
of this remedy for the initial choice of quality.20 For a firm that picks low
20A firm seeking to maximize returns from retention of dissatisfied customers must pick
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quality while pretending to be high quality, second-period profits are
s(ph()− c) + (1− s)(1− σ())(ph()− c− ). (22)
Here the first term represents future profits from satisfied customers and
the second term reflects the profit from unhappy customers that the firm
manages to retain. In comparison the choice of high quality entails higher
initial cost κj but delivers higher future profit
t(ph()− c) + (1− t)(1− σ())(ph()− c− ). (23)
The net incremental gain from investing in quality is
∆ = (t− s)[(1− σ())) + (ph()− c)σ()]− κj (24)
The last expression is easy to understand. The choice of high quality reduces
the number of unhappy customers by fraction (t − s) which results in sav-
ings on aggregate discounts paid for active retention (the first term in square
brackets) and avoids loss of profits from customers who choose to leave re-
gardless (the second term). Recall that in our basic model, which ignored
active retention, the incremental gain is simply
∆=0 = (t− s)[(ph(0)− c)σ(0)]− κj (25)
Given any distribution of costs κj, in which setting would more firms be
inclined to invest in quality ex-ante? We are unable to order the two cases
unambiguously. In general the ability to placate unhappy customers ex-
post reduces the incentive to invest in quality ex-ante, but as σ(0) > σ(),
the comparison is sensitive to the cost of placating customers. Consider an
extreme case in which optimally-chosen discount successfully eliminates all
attrition. With σ() = 0, the choice of quality involves a tradeoff between
the incremental cost of future discounts (t− s) and κj.
 to maximize (1−σ())(ph()− c− ). In our setting the optimal discount is independent
of the choice of quality, so in what follows we assume that it is set at this optimal value.
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In many cases future discounts are offered not to all unhappy customers
but only to those who complain vociferously. Such targeting amounts to a
form of price discrimination: those who reveal themselves more anger-prone
(of high γ type) by complaining are offered future discounts particular to
them, just as those known to have high elasticities of demand are offered
lower prices by a price-discriminating firm. If anger can be targeted in this
way, it further reduces the incentive to invest in quality for all.
Some review fora offer suppliers a right-of-reply in response to a hostile
review (see, for example, Tripadvisor.com). As Goldman (2011) points out,
this feature can allow a provider not only to correct misinformation but also
to turn a simple negative statement (complaint) into a conversation between
the firm and the customer. Note again that the objective is not only (or
even primarily) to assuage that aggrieved customer, but the numerous third
parties who are ‘over-hearing’ that conversation online. The importance of
customer-to-customer transmission of grievances is evident in the effort that
many firms now put into managing their online reputations. Sometimes
this has proved controversial, in particular the use of software packages such
as Klout and Debatescape which companies use to trawl social networking
sites looking for people posting negative comments, who they then contact.
As British Telecom’s Director of Customer Services Warren Buckley put it
recently, online chatting is like “... someone having a conversation in a pub
– just a very big pub. We can’t stop people saying negative things about us.
What we can do is identify them and offer to address their concerns.”21
21British Telecom uses Debatescape to find customers making negative comments on-
line, who are then contacted by “BT Sarah”. Many find this practice unnerving (see
the headline in the Daily Mail, 6 June 2010, “How BT Sarah Spies on Your Facebook
Account”) but companies defend it as a legitimate instrument of customer relations.
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4.3 Social learning and the size-distribution of firms
The impact of increased internet usage and the significance of e-WOM for
consumer behaviour may have significant impact on the evolution of firms
and their size distribution. There is an emerging interest and literature on
this relationship.22
Cheung et al. (2010) survey the impact of e-WOM on sales growth of
firms. Online reputations and review histories have been shown to be sig-
nificant determinants of sales of electronic games (Zhu and Zhang (2010)),
and box-office receipts (Duan et al. 2008), among other things. Lee et al.
(2011) note a debate amongst researchers regarding the likely impact of the
emergence of e-WOM on the distribution of firm size.
To explore these sorts of effects satisfactorily would require a more sophis-
ticated specification of the ‘architecture’ of review websites than embedded
in the model presented here. Popular review websites collate and present
their information in a variety of different ways. Some websites summarize
reviewers’ data to rank rival service-providers – e.g. Tripadvisor.com tells
the viewer that, for instance, Pappasitto’s Cantina is the 14th best restau-
rant out of 1413 in Houston. Expedia.com gives a ‘star rating’ on a scale
of 1 to 5 to hotels whilst Toptable.com provides a score out of 10 to restau-
rant experiences, so these are effectively normalized to provide a measure of
complaint-intensity. Most – including those just mentioned – allow the user
to access the written reviews in raw form.
The way in which consumers combine information from multiple websites
with their own priors and experiences is, of course, open to question. Even
in the simplified environment faced by the consumer in our base model,
the updating of beliefs was a statistically sophisticated and computationally
demanding process. In reality people are more likely to apply heuristics in
combining different sources of evidence.
22Dellarocas (2006) provides a theoretical model of the impact of e-WOM on various
market outcomes, including sales, consumer surplus and firm profitability.
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While several studies have focused on the average (mean or median) re-
view score, Clemons et al. (2006) point to the likely significance of extreme
reviews. Using data from beer review websites (beerhunter.com and rate-
beer.com) they show that sales growth or loss were better predicted by the
numbers of extreme ratings: “... increasingly reviews are prepared and posted
by individuals who have been either appalled by, or delighted by an individual
product or service experience.” Recognizing that posts come from individuals
in the tails of the distribution of willingness to complain complicates infer-
ence, but we would still expect a Bayesian to update to prefer firms with the
lowest measure of complaints-intensity, which is what is needed to drive the
qualitative results in this paper.
In many cases social learning may be biased towards the reporting of neg-
ative reviews, in that online fora are more likely to attract angry customers
eager to vent their anger than those who are delighted.23 Further, websites
such as ripoffreport.com and complaintsboard.com seek to collate consumer
complaints: by design information disseminated on these websites is drawn
from just one tail of the distribution. In such settings social learning has the
potential to damage a firm’s carefully built brand or reputation.
Indeed large firms may be more vulnerable to reputational damage through
e-WOM: they are more likely to feature on freely-accessible review websites,
and their larger customer base may generate greater instances of complaints.
Complaints against small firms may be relatively sparse, and often confined
to specialist fora such as Angie’s List – limited to paying subscribers. While
users of online fora should correctly normalize the number of complaints
against the size of the customer base (large firms are often at pains to project
the number of complaints against them in the context of their large customer
base), the heuristics commonly used to assess firm reputations may not cap-
ture this fully. If so, growing importance of social learning has the potential
23Consider, for instance, the suggestive title of Blackshaw’s best-seller, Satisfied Cus-
tomers Tell Three Friends, Angry Customers tell 3000: Running a Business in Today’s
Consumer-Driven World, Crown, 2008.
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to drive customers away from larger firms towards small firms. This would,
other things equal, have the effect of reducing heterogeneity of firm size. In
sum, with only negative reviews, the inability of consumers to normalize the
number of complaints by the size of firm (number of transactions) could be
a source of dis-economies of scale.
Our analysis so far has suggested that social learning has a positive im-
pact on average quality. However, simple modifications of our model, while
preserving its essential mechanics, can suggest alternative possibilities, in-
cluding settings where the impact of social learning on average quality may
be perverse.
To develop this we consider, as in our basic model, a setting in which firms
pick their quality levels and customers move among firms reacting to their
direct experience and information gathered through social learning. How-
ever we now extend the setting to allow for multiple periods. Typically, in
multi-period settings progressive gathering and sharing of information would
induce customers to converge to high-quality firms. We restrict the possi-
bility of such complete convergence by assuming that there are overlapping
generations of customers, each living for only two periods and choosing from
long-lived firms. If information on firm reputations is not transmitted fully
across generations, low-quality firms can persist in the long run.
We also allow for size heterogeneity among firms. In particular, we con-
sider an industry that has N small firms each of unit size (as measured by
their initial customer base) and one large firm of size B > 1. For any gener-
ation, consumers pick a firm based on price and prior perception of quality
in the initial period. In the next period customers may switch based on their
past experience and information gathered from others of their generation.
Those who have a positive experience stick with their current provider. Of
those who have negative experiences, a fraction switch based on rational and
emotivational reasons.
As before, let σ denote the attrition rate among those who have a poor
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experience with their provider. But we now allow the possibility that attrition
rates may vary across firms. Specifically, assuming that social learning makes
the reputations of large firms more fragile than small ones, we posit that
σL > σS. Over time, as social learning becomes more significant as an
information channel, this differential in attrition rates might grow.
Our purpose is to identify outcomes in which social learning lowers av-
erage quality amongst providers. We focus on an equilibrium in which the
large firm finds it profitable to invest in high quality, and among the cluster
of N small firms only a fraction λ do.24 The first feature requires that for
the large firm the cost of investment in quality is sufficiently low relative to
the advantage it produces in terms of retention and acquisition of customers.
The second feature requires that when the N otherwise-identical small firms
are ordered by the cost of investment in quality, that investment is just opti-
mal for the marginal firm. We assume that the distribution of costs supports
this equilibrium outcome.
The differential in average quality between the large firm and small firms
can be sustained in equilibrium only if there is a compensating price dif-
ferential. If only a fraction λ of small firms are high quality, buying from
a randomly-selected small firm will deliver a good experience with a lower
probability (λt + (1 − λ)s) as compared to probability t when buying from
a large firm. If so, small firms can sell only if they charge less than the large
firm: we have pS(λ) < pL.
Consider how consumers might switch across firms over time. Among
those who initially picked the large firm and had a poor experience, a fraction
σL will abandon that firm, moving instead to one of the small firms. Given
the large firm’s size B, the aggregate mass of customers switching from the
large to small firms is
ΨLS = B(1− t)σL. (26)
24This is a simple modification of our previous setting in which, with firms of identical
size, a subset – the so-called ‘basic segment’ – were unambiguously low quality while in
the premium segment a fraction λ chose high quality.
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Consumers who are disappointed by their initial pick of a small firm may
switch either to another small firm or to the more expensive but ostensi-
bly high-quality large firm – recall that the price differential across the two
segments leaves consumers indifferent. To simplify the analysis assume that
customers abandoning small firms always move to the large firm, though the
assumption is not essential for our qualitative argument.25 In this setting,
the aggregate churn from the N small firms to the large firm is
ΨSL = N [λ(1− t) + (1− λ)(1− s)]σS. (27)
Over time the relative shares of the large and small firms in this industry will
depend on the volume of these flows across segments. If, for instance, churn
from the large firm exceeds that from small firms (that is, ΨLS > ΨSL) the
large firm will shrink and small firms will grow in size.
In steady state, the relative shares will be stable only when ΨLS = ΨSL,
or that
B(1− t)σL = N [λ(1− t) + (1− λ)(1− s)]σS. (28)
Consider how this steady state might be altered if increased reliance on social
learning caused σL to rise faster than σS. To match the increase in the left
hand side of the above equality, the right hand side must rise. This may be
achieved in various ways, either an increase in N , the number of firms in
the small-firm segment, relative to B, or through a fall in average quality λ
in the small-firm segment (recall that (1 − s) > (1 − t), so that a fall in λ
will cause the right-hand side to increase). Regardless, average quality in the
industry is hurt by increased reliance on social learning amongst customers
of the large firm. In plain terms, if social learning increases attrition away
from the reliably high-quality large firm towards firms that are less-reliably
high quality, average quality falls.
25The assumption is easily justified in settings where small firms have limited geograph-
ical reach, so that any customer has access to only one small firm while the large firm can
serve all customers.
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5 Conclusions
It is widely accepted that emotions – especially anger – can be important
determinants of consumer behaviour. Our ambition in this paper has been to
embed anger into a formal model of supplier-switching in a repeat purchase
setting, and to explore the relationship between consumer anger and the
firms’ provision of quality.
Our model builds upon the small literature on anger and market inter-
action initiated by Julio Rotemberg. Our analysis differs in several funda-
mental ways, however. In terms of modeling anger we adopt a continuous
measure – capturing the notion of degrees of anger, consistent with psycho-
logical research – rather than the binary angry/not angry approach adopted
by Rotemberg. Moreover by modeling a competitive market, rather than a
single firm, we are able to think about the strategic inter-dependence among
sellers. In our model, for example, the extent to which bad performance
by one firm will lead to lost customers is sensitive to choices made by its
competitors, and vice versa.
We find that the strategic interaction between providers and consumers
can result in multiple equilibria, with the equilibria varying in the fraction
of firms supplying high quality and the level of customer churn. Consumer
anger, by augmenting churn, reinforces incentives for service providers to
invest in the provision of quality. However, when consumers’ switching is
guided purely by their own experience with the service, it supports only
limited investment in quality: in our basic model, not all firms invest in high
quality even when investment is not very costly, and there may be equilibrium
outcomes in which there is no investment in quality at all.
In contrast, social learning – say, the public sharing of negative service
experiences through online media – increases attrition and also directs switch-
ing customers to firms that are more likely to be high quality. The combined
effect is to induce more investment in quality: in our model the low quality
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equilibrium is eliminated and, with enough social learning, we may have out-
comes where all firms that are able to choose to invest in provision of high
quality. While learn through social media is likely to reinforce average qual-
ity, we also outline settings where it might have perverse effects on average
quality.
Our model is simple and we have outlined some of the ways in which it
can be extended. Future work should allow for more nuanced management
of reputation by firms using non-price signals, such as investing in a brand.
But the essential elements of our model – that customers can get angry when
they feel badly treated by their provider and that firms will recognize that
possibility when making quality decisions – are readily defensible.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The first equilibrium is straightforward to estab-
lish. If no firm invests in quality (λ = 0), customers derive no benefit from
switching, so σ = 0 is an optimal response. At the same time, if no customer
switches in the face of a bad experience, the choice of low quality choice does
not hurt a firm’s profit and avoids cost κj: if so, λ = 0 is optimal.
Under Assumption 2, there exist further equilibria. To characterize these
we consider the magnitude F (λ)−λ. From Result 2, σ(1) = 0, so ∆(1, κj) =
−κj: if investment in quality is not profitable when λ = 1, we have F (1) = 0,
so that F (λ)− λ is negative as λ tends to 1. By Assumption 2, F (λ)− λ is
strictly positive for some λ ∈ (0, 1). As F (λ)− λ is a continuous function of
λ, with a positive value for some λ and negative value as λ tends to 1, there
must exist some value λ∗ such that F (λ∗)− λ∗ = 0.
We cannot rule out multiple equilibria of this kind. Given that σ(0) = 0,
then F (λ) − λ < 0 for λ close to zero whenever κj > 0. If so, there is a
second equilibrium: however this equilibrium is unstable. To see why, note
that for λ > λ∗1 in the neighborhood of λ
∗
1, we have F (λ) > F (λ
∗
1), which will
cause λ to rise. 
Proof of Proposition 2: With complete information, a firm’s incremental
gain from investing in quality
∆(λ, κj) =
σ
λ
(t− s)uˆ− κj
is decreasing in λ. If so, F (λ) the fraction that find it profitable to invest
is (weakly) decreasing in λ, and hence F (λ) − λ is strictly decreasing. We
see that F (λ) − λ is positive at λ = 0 (because limλ→0 F (λ) = 1) and non-
positive at λ = 1, so there must exist some λ∗c such that F (λ
∗
c) = λ
∗
c : this
characterizes the unique equilibrium for this complete information case.
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Under complete information, investment in high quality improves both
customer retention and acquisition: the higher profitability of investing in
quality under complete information implies F (λ) > F (λ) for all λ. If so,
equilibrium under complete information supports strictly higher provision of
quality.
If the fixed costs κj is low enough such that (σ(t − s)uˆ) − κj > 0 for all
i, we have F (1) = K(σ(t − s)uˆ) = 1. In that case it is a dominant strategy
for every firm to invest in quality. 
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